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21. Introduction
This paper compares the dynamical behaviors of fixed and flexible price regimes for an
economy with a monopolistically competitive manufacturing sector in which firms base
decisions on expectations about product demands. In the fixed price regime, manufacturers
adhere to prices set at the beginning of each period, with disequilibria being manifested in
divergences between outputs and demands. In the flexible price regime, outputs are sold at
market-clearing prices, with disequilibria being manifested in differences between
manufacturers’ planned prices and the market-clearing-prices.
Our analysis is in the spirit of Jin (2001), who examines the stability of a
monopolistically competitive industry, where boundedly rational manufacturers follow
simple strategies based on limited information. In contrast to Jin, we assume a technology
and consumer preferences based on the famous Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model. Given the
widespread use of the Dixit-Stiglitz model in economic analysis [see Brakman and Heijdra
(2004)], the lack of analyses of its short-run dynamics is surprising [an exception being
Maussner (1992)].
2. Assumptions
The economy comprises a monopolistically competitive manufacturing sector with n firms
producing different varieties, where n is sufficiently large that firms do not behave
strategically, and a perfectly competitive residual sector. The invariant total labor supply is
S
L  and labor is instantaneously mobile between sectors. Production in the residual sector
involves constant returns to scale. In contrast, manufacturing operates under increasing
returns: each firm requires a fixed labor input of α  and has a constant marginal labor
3requirement of β . Consumers devote an invariant share γ  of income to manufactures, with
1σ >  being the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
At the beginning of each time period, the duration of which corresponds to that of
labor contracts, the labor market clears simultaneously with a forward market for the product
of the residual sector, ensuring zero profits in that sector in each period. However, there are
no forward markets for manufactures: labor demands are based on anticipated product
demands. Faced by wage 
t
w  at the outset of period t, each manufacturer demands the labor
needed to meet the product demand it expects at a price implied by the pricing routine
t t
p wθ= , where ( )1θ βσ σ= −  is the familiar Dixit-Stiglitz wage-price mark-up. For each
price regime, we consider two possible anticipated demand curves for a variety based on
information the manufacturer has about the demand 1td −  at price 1tp − . The first is the non-
linear anticipated demand curve:
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where, in using the perceived price elasticity σ−  to determine the expected impact of an
own price change, each manufacturer assumes that the prices of other varieties will remain
unchanged. The second is the linear curve tangent to (1) at ( )1 1,t tp d− − :
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which is defined for ( )1 1t tp p σ σ−≤ + . Given the same prices for all varieties, the actual
demand curve per variety is:
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where Y is aggregate income.
3. Temporary Equilibria and General Equilibrium
Temporary equilibrium with fixed prices
For the fixed price regime, once labor contracts are signed, each manufacturer maintains a
fixed price throughout the ensuing period. At the temporary equilibrium (TE) wage ˆ
t
w , each
manufacturer sets price ˆ ˆ
t t
p wθ=  and hires the labor needed to produce ( )ˆ ˆat t ts d p= , where
( )ˆat td p  is derived by substituting in (1) or (2) the previous period’s fixed price 1ˆ tp −  and the
corresponding quantity demanded 1
ˆ
t
d
−
. The quantity sold of each variety is determined by
the minimum of the supply and of the quantity demanded at ˆ
t
p ; i.e., by { }ˆˆmin ,t ts d , where
( )ˆ ˆt t td d p=  from (3). If there is excess demand, consumers are rationed. If there is excess
supply, the surplus is destroyed (or, if firms identify the excess supply after entering into
binding labor contracts but before actually using the labor, they simply reduce production).
Temporary equilibrium with flexible prices
For the flexible price regime, each manufacturer, having based labor hiring on a planned
price, sells its output at the market-clearing price. At the TE wage 
t
w
(
, each supplies the
demand it expects at its planned price p
t t
p wθ=( ( . That is, ( )a pt t ts d p=( ( , where ( )a pt td p(  is
derived from (1) or (2) by substituting the previous period’s market-clearing price 1tp −
(
 and
5the corresponding demand 1td −
(
. Market-clearing in period t implies that the (inelastic)
supply of each variety is sold at price 
t
t
Y
p
ns
γ
=
(
( .
General equilibrium
A general equilibrium (GE) is a state of rest for the dynamical process concerned. For the
fixed price regime, a TE is a GE iff ˆ ˆ
t t
d s= ; this requires ( ) ( )ˆ ˆat t t td p d p=  where ˆ ˆt tp wθ= .
For the flexible price regime, a TE is a GE iff p
t t
p p=
( (
 where p
t t
p wθ=( ( ; this requires
( ) ( )a pt t t td p d p=( ( . That is, for both regimes, GE requires that each manufacturer correctly
anticipates the quantity demanded at the price implied by the pricing routine. The GE wage,
necessarily the same for both regimes, is identified in Figure 1. The curve SM shows the
labor supply to the manufacturing sector after the derived labor demand of the residual
sector is met. The curve M  shows what the manufacturing sector’s labor demand would be
at each wage, if manufacturers were to have correct product demand expectations at the
price implied by applying the pricing routine to that wage. Derived from (3), M  is also
what the sector’s derived labor demand curve would have been if there had been a forward
market for manufactures, synchronized with the labor market. The intersection of M  and SM
determines the GE wage w , the corresponding price being p wθ= . In the GE, the
anticipated demand curve would be m′  for (1) and m′′  for (2).
4. Dynamics Compared
The dynamical behaviors of the two regimes are dramatically different. Figure 2 shows this
difference for the non-linear anticipated demand curve (1), assuming, for the purpose of the
argument, that for both regimes 1 1ˆ t tw w w− −= >
(
, so that , 1 , 1
ˆ
M t M t ML L L− −= >
(
.
6Fixed price regime
In Figure 2, manufacture’s labor demand curve in period t is ˆ
t
m . Based on information on
product demand 1
ˆ
t
d
−
 at the previous period’s fixed price 1 1ˆ ˆt tp wθ− −= , ˆ tm  must intersect M
at 1ˆt tw w −= ; at that wage, manufacturers would set the same price as in period 1t −  and their
demand expectations would be correct. Therefore, there would be excess labor supply at
1
ˆ
t t
w w
−
= . However, at 
t
w w= , there would be excess labor demand since, for a fall in the
wage from 1ˆ tw −  to w , manufacturers, who do not anticipate that others would also change
their prices, would overestimate the impact of the corresponding price fall on demand and
would demand too much labor at w . Consequently, ˆ
t
w  must lie between 1ˆ tw −  and w . It
follows that the sequence of TEs necessarily converges monotonically on the GE. This
proposition carries over to the linear anticipated demand curve (1). It can be shown, for both
(1) and (2), that:
( )
2
1
2
ˆ 2
ˆ0 1
ˆ 2
t
t
t
dw
w w
dw
γσ γσ γ
γσ γσ σ
+ − +< = = <
− +
(4)
Flexible price regime
In Figure 2, manufacture’s labor demand curve in period t is 
t
m
(
. Based on information on
product demand 1td −
(
 at the previous period’s market-clearing price 1tp −
(
, 
t
m
(
 must intersect
M  at , 1M tL −
(
. Since , 1M t ML L− >
(
, the market-clearing price in 1t −  was necessarily below the
GE price: 1tp p− <
(
. At a current wage 
t
w w= , there would necessarily be excess labor
supply: manufacturers, who do not anticipate that others would change their prices, would
overestimate the reduction in demand resulting from a price increase from 1tp −
(
 to pp wθ=
7and would demand too little labor at w . Consequently, the TE wage necessarily overshoots
the GE wage, i.e., 1tw w− >
(
 implies 
t
w w<
(
. For the linear anticipated demand curve (2), the
TE wage always moves in the direction of the GE wage but it need not overshoot it.
It can be shown that for both ADCs:
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )
1
1 1
0
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The stability condition, ( )2 1 3 2γ σ γ− > − , is always satisfied for 0.5γ ≥ . However, for
0.5γ < , a period-doubling bifurcation occurs as σ  increases through:
1
1
1 2
B
γ
σ
γ
−
= +
−
(6)
For (1), since the map ( )1t tw f w −=( (  is always monotonically declining, the system is always
attracted to a period-two cycle for 
B
σ σ> . In contrast, the dynamics of (2) exhibits complex
behavior for 
B
σ σ> . Figure 3 shows the map ( )1t tw g w −=( (  for 0.25γ = , 10000Y = ,
10000
S
L = , 600n = , 1α β= = , and 4.58σ = . The map is only defined for a wage above
( ) ( )1 Sw Y L nγ α= − − ; for a lower wage, there would be no labor available for production
by the manufacturing sector after its own fixed labor requirements nα  and the derived
demand of the residual sector have been met. The attracting period-three cycle is the
hallmark of a chaotic dynamical system.
5. A Final Comment
We have compared the dynamical implications of alternative manufacturers’
routines, assuming an invariant number of firms. With free entry and exit of manufacturers,
8a long-run general equilibrium would require a zero rate of profit. With entry and exit
dependent on the anticipated rate of profit, complex dynamical behavior could arise even
with a forward market for manufactures, synchronized with the labor market.
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